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that the lowly traffic violation- of which everyone has been guilty at one
time or another - may be established as the basis for searches circumventing
the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
MICHAEL A. RIDER

INSURANCE: PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE VICARIOUSLY
LIABLE POLICYHOLDER
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
Plaintiff sued jointly the owner and the driver of an automobile for
compensatory and punitive damages arising from the driver's gross negligence
in an accident. The insurer defended the suit on the owner's behalf and
filed for a summary judgment on the claim for punitive damages, asserting
that an automobile owner was not vicariously liable for punitive damages
under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine.' The trial court held
the owner could be held liable for punitive damages, and the insurer informed the owner that it would disclaim any liability for such damages. The
owner entered a third party suit against the insurer, and the trial court
entered a partial summary judgment holding the insurer liable for any punitive damages assessed against the owner. On interlocutory appeal2 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal HELD, punitive damages assessed against the insured solely on the basis of vicarious liability arising out of ownership of
an automobile, and not because of any active wrongdoing on the insured's
part, were within the scope of the coverage provided by a liability insurance
policy.3

Insurers have often been held liable for punitive damages when the insured was himself a wrongdoer. 4 However, most courts holding insurers liable
have been careful to distinguish intentional misconduct from wilful or wanton
1. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine holds the owner of a motor vehicle liable
for the torts of others using the vehicle with his consent. Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188,
31 So. 2d 268 (1947); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 2d 629 (1920);
Note, The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine: Unique Automobile Law in Florida,
5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412 (1952).

2. Under Florida court rules a third party defendant may make an interlocutory appeal
from a summary judgment on liability. FLA. APr. R. 4.2.
3. 261 So. 2d 545 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
4. E.g., Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); Morrell .
Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923), error dismissed, 264 U.S. 572 (1923); Carroway v.
Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); J. APPLEM AN, INsURANcE LAW & PRACTICE
§4312 (1962); 15 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §56:27 (2d ed. 1966).
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misconduct, and have denied recovery where the acts of the insured were
intentional.5 Where insurers have been found liable, the rationale most
frequently used is that the insurer contracted to indemnify the insured for
all sums awarded in legal actions resulting from bodily injury, and therefore
both punitive and compensatory damages are within the scope of the policy.0
Courts have also noted that any ambiguity in the policy should be construed
against the insurer.7 Therefore, the average policyholder's belief that his
insurance will pay any damages assessed against him has also been advanced
in support of insurer's liability."
Florida and a minority of states 0 have refused to hold the insurer liable
for wilful and wanton acts committed by the insured on the ground that the
insured should not be financially insulated from such conduct. These jurisdictions indicate that punitive damages are assessed to punish the tortfeasor
and to deter others from similar misconduct, rather than to compensate the
injured party.'" For this reason vicarious liability for punitive damages is
generally denied unless the party held to be vicariously liable has participated
in or authorized the wrongful act.12 Therefore, the imposition of a legal
penalty on the insurer would be inappropriate, since the insurer has done no
wrong.'3 The purpose of punitive damages would be defeated by allowing

5. E.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244
F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir.
1956); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
6. United States Fidelity 8- Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 263, 189 So. 897, 899 (1939); Carroway v.
Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 204, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965).
7. Hendricks v. American Employers Ins. Co., 176 So. 2d 827, 830 (2d Ct. App. La. 1965);
Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 248, 172 A.2d 206, 212 (1961).
8. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 648, 383 S.W.2d 1,
5 (1964); J. APPLEMAN note 4 supra.
9. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962); Ging v.
American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756, 760 (N.D. Fla. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
423 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1970); Tedesco v. Maryland Fire & Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 537, 18
A.2d 357, 359 (1941); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 53 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
10. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966); Universal Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 17, 39 F.2d 776, 779 (1934); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17,
23 (Mo. App. 1964); Esmond v. Lisdo, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 209, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966).
11. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern Nat'l
Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla.
1950); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 279, 149 So. 631, 632 (1933); Nicholson
v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 53 '2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965):
12. Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 284, 300, 194 P.2d 281,
293 (1948); Rickman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 124 Mont. 451, 462, 227 P.2d 607, 613 (1951).
See generally Note, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident
Suit, 19 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 144 (1957).
13. Northwestern Nat'1 Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1962). See
generally Note, Automobile Liability Insurance and Punitive Damages, 39 TEMP. L.Q.
459 (1966).
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recovery and, since the insurer would pass the damages along to the public
in the form of increased premiums, the public would in effect be punishing
itself.14
A distinction has long been made, however, where the insured is assessed
punitive damages on the basis of vicarious liability.' 5 This distinction was
first recognized in the leading case, Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare
Finance Co.,' 6 where an employer was held liable for punitive damages on
the doctrine of respondeat superior. His servant recklessly backed a truck
1
out of a garage while the injured party was standing on the running board. 7
The court held that when there was no direct or indirect volition on the
part of the employer in the commission of the wrongful act, no public policy
was violated by protecting him from his employee's reckless act.18 The criterion used in subsequent cases thus became that a vicariously liable insured
who had not participated in or authorized the unlawful act could recover
from his insurance company for punitive damages assessed against him. 19
Two Florida cases 20 have recognized the distinction drawn in Welfare Finance
and have allowed recovery from insurance companies when insured employers
were assessed punitive damages arising out of assaults committed by their
employees.

21

In the instant case the court noted that the automobile owner, like the
employers in earlier decisions, was not the active tortfeasor. Thus, the in22
surer's liability for punitive damages would not be contrary to public policy.

The insurer attempted to distinguish the earlier decisions, which held the
insured liable on the doctrine of respondeat superior, from the instant case
where liability was based on the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.23 The
court, however, held that the principles applicable to the insurance of an
employer would apply with equal force to the insurance of a motor vehicle
owner.2 4 Employers held liable on the doctrine of respondeat superior have
not, in fact, been the only vicariously liable policyholders permitted recovery.
In Malanga v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. 25 a partnership held

14.

Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1962).

15. E.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1968); Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
734 (1935); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d
591 (1964)

(dictum). This distinction is of course unnecessary in those states that hold

the insurer liable even where the insured is the active tortfeasor. In these states the insurer
is liable a fortiori where the insured is not personally guilty of any reckless behavior.

16.
17.
18.
19.
Co. v.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
Id.
Id. at 60.
Commerdal Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968); Sterling Ins.
Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
Id.
Id.
261 So. 2d at 549.
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 549.
28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958).
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vicariously liable for punitive damages arising out of an assault committed
by a partner was permitted to recover from its insurer on the basis of the
Welfare Finance rationale.
The present case directly and logically follows the trend of earlier decisions, holding insurers liable for punitive damages assessed against any
vicariously liable policyholder. Punitive damages are intended to punish the
tortfeasor and act as a deterrent to others. 20 Shifting the burden of punitive
damages to an automobile owner or an insurer obviously frustrates this
purpose. The court, however, assumed for the purpose of this action that the
shifting of liability for punitive damages to the owner was permissible.27
Therefore, it would have been inconsistent for the court to hold that public
policy prohibited the further shifting of the burden to the insurer. Any injustice in the result reached in the instant case lay in holding the owner
liable for punitive damages under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine,
an issue expressly not decided by this court.
The instant case represents an extension of existing Florida law by upholding an automobile insurer's liability for punitive damages under the
dangerous instrumentality theory.28 Since automobile accidents have traditionally been a fertile area for tort litigation, the present case is likely to
spur an increase in claims for punitive damages where the negligent driver
is not the owner of the vehicle. Further, as automobile insurance has been
made compulsory in Florida, 9 this decision will affect the insurance coverage
of every driver in the state.
As a practical matter, shifting the liability for punitive damages to the
insurer provides a deep pocket that is likely to lead to excessive awards.
Under recent Florida decisions the insurance company may be directly joined
in the action, 30 so the jury may be aware that the insurer is the real party in
interest. Since punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are not
measurable by any objective standardal there is a tremendous potential for
abuse. The likelihood of abuse is increased substantially when it is known
that the party who will pay the damages is a corporate entity engaged in
32
the business of assuming risks.

26. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966); Universal Indem.
Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 17, 39 F.2d 776, 779 (1934); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17,
23 (Mo. App. 1964); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 209, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966).
27. 261 So. 2d at 548.
28. Prior to the trial court's decision no Florida court had held an automobile owner
liable for punitive damages; no case seeking punitive damages from a vicariously liable
automobile owner ever arose before 1968. Lyon v. Reynolds, g0 FLa. Supp. 71 (Cir. Ct.
Dade County 1968).
29. FIA. STAT. §627.733 (1971).

S0. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
31. C. McComacK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAmAGEs 296 (1935).
82. For a refutation of the assumption that juries tend to assess larger judgments
against insurers see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 167 (FlM 1970) (Ervin,
C.J. dissenting).
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The insurer's liability for punitive damages may affect the frequency with
which punitive damages are assessed. The presence of a potentially liable
insurer could lead juries to assess punitive damages where none would otherwise be imposed. Since Florida courts do not allow divulgence of insurance
policy limits,3 3 juries might award damages exceeding the policy limits and
thus place the burden to pay the excess upon the automobile owner.
Any extension of punitive damages to automobile insurers seems particularly inappropriate at the present time. The adoption of limited no-fault
automobile insurance in Florida- 4 indicates that the legislature is beginning
to view automobile insurance as a system to compensate the injured party
rather than as a means of indemnifying the party at fault. Punitive damages
are based on the traditional concept of fault, and therefore are inconsistent
with the legislative trend manifested by the adoption of no-fault insurance.
Although insurers cannot disclaim liability for torts committed by drivers
other than the insured owner, 35 there is nothing to prevent insurers from
expressly disclaiming liability for punitive damages 3o as long as the disclaimer
is evident in the insurance contract.37 If insurance companies are frequently
held liable for punitive damages they will no doubt take this logical step,
leaving automobile owners liable for punitive damages for torts they did
not commit. The patent injustice of this result discloses the defect inherent
in ever allowing the burden of punitive damages to be shifted from the tortfeasor to the automobile owner.
LEIGHTON

33. In Stecher
policy limits was
deemed excessive.
34. FLA. STAT.
35. FLA. STAT.

36.
37.

D.

YATES, JR.

v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971), however, the divulgence of the
held harmless error when the jury returned an award that was not
§§627.730-.741 (1971).
§324.151 (1971).

Marks, Automobile Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 1966 INs. L.J. 484.
See, e.g., Hendricks v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 176 So. 2d 827 (La. 1965).
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